I am a second-year DPhil student in Legal Philosophy. My thesis question is: when a person A has consented to a person B committing a crime against them, (when) should this consent make a decisive difference in a trial? In other words, (when) should consent be considered a legal justification? I was mainly trained in continental philosophy (Ecole Normale Supérieure of Paris; Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), analytical philosophy (EHESS; NYU and Oxford as a visiting student) and French law (Paris X Nanterre). I have also done internships in different jurisdictions (Conseil d'Etat, European Court of Human Rights, Paris Administrative Court, Orléans Appeal Court).
Sebastian joined the DPhil in Law Program in October 2017. His doctoral research focuses on legal reasoning and the theory of precedents, particularly on the demands of the rule of law on judicial decision-making. Sebastian is also interested in the philosophy of authority, practical reasoning, and the sources of law. His work is supervised by Timothy Endicott and Grant Lamond. Before coming to Oxford, Sebastian completed his Master of Laws at Harvard Law School and his Bachelor of Laws in Chile. Sebastian is a qualified lawyer in Chile.